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R.A.JV. v. City of St. Paul: A Curious Way
to Protect Free Speech
To combat the continuing evils of racism, some legal advocates have
urged new remedies.1 The worst discriminatory expressions should be
outlawed, these scholars assert, to help purge racism.2 They argue that
such expressions-both spoken and written slurs, as well as acts such as
cross burnings-are outside the scope of the First Amendment3 because
they perpetuate a divided society and keep minorities from being empow-
ered.4 As one writer noted:
When the Klan burns a cross on the lawn of a black per-
son who joined the NAACP or exercised his right to move to a
formerly all-white neighborhood, the effect of this speech does
not result from the persuasive power of an idea operating freely
in the market. It is a threat, a threat made in the context of a
history of lynchings, beatings and economic reprisals that made
good on earlier threats, a threat that silences a potential
speaker.5
With racially motivated hate crimes on the increase,6 states, 7 munic-
1. See, eg., Richard Delgado, Words that Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, 17
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133, 143-47, 179 (1982) (suggesting a civil remedy in tort for racial
slurs); Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go, Regulating Racist Speech On
Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 430, 457-66 (arguing that racist speech uttered in face-to-face en-
counters is not protected by the First Amendment); Mar J. Matsuda, Public Response to Ra-
cist Speech. Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2335-41 (1989) (detailing
the negative effects of racist hate messages). Matsuda argued in favor of "criminalization of a
narrow, explicitly defined class of racist hate speech, to provide public redress for the most
serious harm, while leaving many forms of racist speech to private remedies." Id. at 2380. She
also contended that the criminalization of some hate speech would guarantee all United States
citizens the "life of dignity" that they have been denied by racism. Id. at 2381. For an argu-
ment against criminalization of racist expression, see Nadine Strossen, Regulating Racist
Speech on Campus: A Modest Proposal?, 1990 DUKE L.J. 484, 549-61. Strossen noted that
laws curbing racist speech only criminalize the most blatant forms of racist expression and,
thus, do not eliminate racism. Id. at 559.
2. Lawrence, supra note 1, at 471-72; Matsuda, supra note 1, at 2380-81.
3. The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law. .. abridging the
freedom of speech." U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Supreme Court has interpreted the First
Amendment's protection of speech as applying not only to verbal and written expression, but
to symbolic expression as well. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (holding
that protected symbolic speech includes the burning of the United States flag during a protest).
Despite the wording of the First Amendment, the Supreme Court has determined that certain
forms of expression are outside the First Amendment's scope and can be regulated by the state.
See infra notes 106-13 and accompanying text.
4. Lawrence, supra note 1, at 471-72; Matsuda, supra note 1, at 2380-81.
5. Lawrence, supra note 1, at 471-72.
6. KlanWatch, an Alabama-based group monitoring bias-crimes across the United
States, reported 25 hate-motivated murders in 1991, the most since the group began its annual
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ipalities,s and even universities 9 have implemented some measures cham-
pioned by the advocates. Many states and municipalities have enacted
laws criminalizing attacks motivated by prejudice,10 with some of these
laws specifically outlawing cross burnings and other tactics associated
with organized bigot groups." Some states also have adopted enhanced
report in 1981. Bernd Debusmann, Hate Crimes In U.S. Reported on Rise, Recession Blamed,
Reuter, Feb. 24, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuter File. Other bias crimes also
increased during 1991, id., continuing the trend of the 1980s. Tanya K. Hernandez, Note, Bias
Crimes: Unconscious Racism in the Prosecution of Racially Motivated Violence, 99 YALE L.J.
845, 845-46 (1990). Between 1980 and 1986, 3000 incidents of bias-related violence were doc-
umented across the nation. Id. To help monitor the number of crimes motivated by racist,
religious, political, sexual, or other types of biases, Congress passed the Hate Crimes Statistics
Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-275, 104 Stat. 140 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 534 (1991)), which
requires the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to include hate crimes in its annual Uni-
form Crime Report, a listing of major crimes occurring in the United States. Russell Snyder,
Reviews Mixed on Justice Department's 'Hate Crime' Effort, UPI, Oct. 29, 1990, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File. The first FBI hate crimes report, released in January, 1993,
indicated that in 1991, African Americans and Jews were most frequently the targets of hate
crime, although the decision by eighteen states, including North Carolina, not to supply data
to the FBI flawed the report. Stephen Labaton, Poor Cooperation Deflates F.B.L Report on
Hate Crimes, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 1993, at A8.
7. Forty-six states enacted hate crimes laws; Maryland became the first state to do so in
1980. Rorie Sherman, Hate Crimes Statutes Abound; Newest, in VL, Among Toughest, NAT'L.
L.J., May 21, 1990, at 3, 28. Only Arkansas, Nebraska, Utah, and Wyoming have not enacted
hate crimes laws. Id. at 28. North Carolina's statute provides that:
If a person shall, because of race, color, religion, nationality, or country of origin,
assault another person, or damage or deface the property of another person, or
threaten to do any such act, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by im-
prisonment up to two years, or a fine, or both.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-401.14 (Supp. 1991).
8. See, e.g., ST. PAUL, MINN., LEG. CODE § 292.01 (1990); see infra note 32.
9. Universities that have adopted policies prohibiting racist and other harassing speech
include the University of California, Emory University, the University of Michigan, the Uni-
versity of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and the University of Wisconsin. DINESH D'SouzA,
ILLIBERAL EDUCATION 146 (1992) (listing some of the universities that have enacted measures
to censor racist and sexist speech). The Stanford University policy prevents discriminatory
harassment by conveying direct hatred or contempt for students, faculty, or university employ-
ees on " 'the basis of their sex, race, color, handicap, religion, sexual orientation, or national or
ethnic origin."' See, e.g., Lawrence, supra note 1, at 450-51 (quoting Stanford University
Policy on Free Expression and Discriminatory Harassment (1990)).
10. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-401.14; Sherman, supra note 7, at 3.
11. Sherman, supra note 7, at 28. For example, New Jersey's statute provides that:
A person is guilty of crime of the third degree if he purposely, knowingly or reck-
lessly puts or attempts to put another in fear of bodily violence by placing on public
or private property a symbol, an object, a characterization, an appellation or graffiti
that exposes another to threats of violence, contempt or hatred on the basis of race,
color, creed or religion, including, but not limited to a burning cross or Nazi swas-
tika. A person shall not be guilty of an attempt unless his actions cause a serious and
imminent likelihood of causing fear of unlawful bodily violence.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:33-10 (West 1991). Other states enacted statutes criminalizing cross
burnings decades ago, in attempts to outlaw the Ku Klux Klan. See, eg., Act of Apr. 30,
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sentencing laws, allowing harsher sentences for assaults and other crimes
committed against minority groups.12 Many universities added speech
codes, making it an honor code violation to harass another student be-
cause of race or gender.13 The measures enacted by states, municipali-
ties, and universities to combat hate crimes have prompted a vocal
debate in society at large.14 Some found the measures unacceptable tac-
1953, ch. 1193, 1953 N.C. Sess. Laws 1142-45 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-
12-12 (1986)). The statute provides, in pertinent part, that:
It shall be unlawful for any person or persons to place or cause to be placed on the
property of another in this State or on a public street or highway, a burning or flam-
ing cross or any manner of exhibit in which a burning or flaming cross real or simu-
lated, is a whole or a part, with the intention of intimidating any person or persons or
of preventing them from doing any act which is lawful, or causing them to do any act
which is unlawful.
Id.
12. See Sherman, supra note 7, at 28 (pointing out that all of the states that have enacted
hate crimes laws in the last decade also have enacted laws providing for enhanced sentences for
felonies motivated by bias). For an example of such sentencing laws, see the California statute
which provides: "[A] person who commits a felony or attempts to commit a felony because of
a victim's race, color, religion, nationality, country of origin, ancestry, or sexual orientation
shall receive an additional term of one, two, or three years in state prison at the court's discre-
tion." CAL. PENAL CODE § 422.75(a) (West Supp. 1992). Several states' enhanced-sentencing
laws are based on a model statute drafted by the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith.
Susan Gellman, Sticks and Stones Can Put You In Jail, But Can Words Increase Your Sen-
tence? Constitutional and Policy Dilemmas of Ethnic Intimidation Laws, 39 UCLA L. REV.
333, 335 (1991). This model statute provides that:
A. A person commits the crime of intimidation if, by reason of the actual or
perceived race, color, religion, national origin or sexual orientation of another indi-
vidual or group of individuals, he violates Section __ of the Penal Code [insert code
provision for criminal trespass, criminal mischief, harassment, menacing, assault,
and/or any other appropriate statutorily proscribed criminal conduct].
B. Intimidation is a __ misdemeanor/felony [the degree of criminal liability
should be made contingent upon the severity of the injury incurred or the property
damaged].
Id. at 344 (quoting CIVIL RIGHTS Div. ADL LEGAL AFFAIRS DEP'T, ADL LAW REPORT:
HATE CRIMES STATUTES: A RESPONSE To ANTI-SEMmSM, VANDALISM, AND VIOLENT
BIGOTRY 1 (1988 & Supp. 1990)).
13. See, e.g., Lawrence, supra note 1, at 449-57; see also D'SOUzA, supra note 9, at 144-47
(describing the rise of speech codes on university campuses).
14. Most of the attention focused on the political correctness movement on college and
university campuses, which is designed to promote tolerance of diverse lifestyles on campus
and multicultural teaching in the classroom. See, e.g., Jerry Adler, Taking Offense: Is This the
New Enlightenment on Campus or the New McCarthyism?, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 24, 1990, at 48
("The goal is to eliminate prejudice, not just of the petty sort that shows up on sophomore
dorm walls, but the grand prejudice that has ruled American universities since their founding:
that the intellectual tradition of Western Europe occupies the central place in the history of
civilization."); Richard Bernstein, The Rising Hegemony of the Politically Correct, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 28, 1990, § 4, at 1 (describing how the political correctness movement on campus
encourages tolerance for minorities, but discourages viewpoint differences); see also D'SOUZA,
supra note 9, at 124-56 (asserting that campus speech restrictions only inflame racial tensions);
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tics designed to silence dissenting political views.1 5  Others found the
measures necessary to protect minorities from intimidation.16 The de-
bate has been conducted largely in the popular press, but recently the
United States Supreme Court stepped in as referee in the case of R.A. V
v. City of St. Paul.7 Many commentators have seen the Court's decision
as putting an end to all hate-crime legislation."
In light of the Supreme Court's decision in R.A. V, this Note exam-
Breaking The Codes, NEW REPUBLIC, July 8, 1991, at 7 (arguing that campus speech restric-
tions and hate-crimes legislation infringe upon the First Amendment).
15. See, eg., D'SouzA, supra note 9, at 156. D'Souza, a conservative, argued that speech
codes have helped keep racism alive on university campuses.
The efforts of the administration... [at several universities] to regulate and enforce a
social etiquette have created an enormous artificiality of discourse among peers, and
thus have become an obstacle to that true openness that seems to be the only sure
footing for equality. For when sentiments are outlawed, they tend to go beneath the
surface, where they fester and emerge in the form of rebellious humor and other
sometimes ugly gestures which can lead to 'racial incidents.' The consequences of
such policies, therefore, is to promote rebellion in the name of harmony, to exacer-
bate bigotry while claiming to fight it, and ultimately to undermine the norms of
fairness and exchange which are central both to the university and to minority hopes
for racial understanding and social justice.
Id. While D'Souza's book was the first major journalistic account of the politically correct
movement, many critics viewed it as overly biased. See, eg., Michael Kinsley, TRB From
Washington: P.C. B.S., NEw REPUBLIC, May 20, 1991, at 8 ("In earlier phases of his young
life, at Dartmouth and Princeton, D'Souza was a right-wing killer not known for his love of
toleration and respect for the other guy's point of view."). While conservatives have been
among the most vocal critics of the political correctness movement and hate-crimes legislation,
some traditional liberal civil libertarians also have joined the chorus. See, eg., Strossen, supra
note I, at 559-60; see also Gellman, supra note 12, at 334 ("[T]he debate over these laws is
occurring not merely between traditional allies, but between one side and itself.... It is as if
everyone involved in the debate over the permissibility and desirability of ethnic intimidation
laws were actually on both sides at once.").
16. Lawrence, supra note 1, at 470-71. Lawrence, who characterized himself as a long-
time civil libertarian, argued that:
Whenever we decide that racist hate speech must be tolerated because of the impor-
tance of tolerating unpopular speech we ask blacks and other subordinated groups to
bear a burden for the good of society-to pay the price for the societal benefit of
creating more room for speech. And we assign this burden to them without seeking
their advice, or consent. This amounts to white domination, pure and simple.
Id. at 472-73; see also Hernandez, supra note 6, at 845 (noting that racism and other biases
prompt assaults and other physical crimes); Matsuda, supra note 1, at 2380 (arguing that the
failure to provide legal redress for racist speech furthers the subordination of minorities and
"perpetuates racism").
17. 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
18. See, e.g., Nat Hentoff, Scalia Outdoes the ACLU, WASH. POsT, June 30, 1992, at A19.
Hentoff sees the Court's decision as bringing an end to all college speech codes and all hate-
crime laws, even those allowing enhanced penalties for bias crimes. Id.; see also Speech Ther-
apy, NEw REPUBLIC, July 13, 1992, at 7 ("[T]he Court has exposed the unconstitutionality of
many state bias laws and virtually all campus hate speech codes. In a stroke, it has repelled
the most serious threat to open debate that the current generation of students has
experienced.").
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ines previous Court decisions involving fighting words.19 It explores the
Court's reasoning for invalidating the St. Paul hate-crimes ordinance,2"
contrasting the majority opinion with those of the concurring Justices.
This Note examines potential problems with the content neutrality test
the Court employed to invalidate the St. Paul ordinance2 1 and deter-
mines that the commentators' conclusion that the R.A. V decision stamps
out all hate-crime laws is not necessarily correct.22
Early on June 21, 1990, Russ and Laura Jones, an African-Ameri-
can couple with five children who had recently moved to a predomi-
nantly white, working-class neighborhood in St. Paul, Minnesota, awoke
to the sound of voices in their front yard.23 Looking outside, the Jones
family saw in their fenced-in yard a small burning cross,24 a device long
associated with the racist tactics of the Ku Klux Klan. 25  Fearing for
their safety, the family called the police.26 Officers arrived, but left after
failing to locate any suspects.27 Shortly thereafter, vandals ignited a sec-
ond cross across the street from the Jones' home and a third cross outside
a neighborhood apartment complex where several black families re-
19. The Court has held that fighting words-words that incite the average recipient into a
fighting rage upon their utterance--may be proscribed because they are outside the protection
of the First Amendment. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942). For a
detailed discussion of the fighting-words doctrine, see notes infra 114-80 and accompanying
text.
20. See infra note 33 and accompanying text for the text of St. Paul's ordinance.
21. See infra notes 194-215 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 230-34 and accompanying text.
23. R.A. V, 112 S. Ct. at 2541.
24. Id. The two-foot tall cross was made out of parts of a wooden chair and was equipped
with a burning propane torch. Tom Hamburger, Court Hears St. Paul Hate-Crimes Case;
Cross Burner Has Challenged Law's Constitutionality, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., Dec. 5,
1991, at A7, A8. The Jones family had been the target of several acts of harassment since
moving into the neighborhood three months earlier, including vandalism to one of the Jones'
cars and an incident where several neighborhood youths called one of the Jones children a
racially derogatory name. Bill McAuliffe, Man Fears Ruling May Encourage Bigots; Victim of
Cross-Burning Says The People Who Did It Will Think of Decision As Victory, MINNEAPOLIS
STAR TRIB., June 23, 1992, at Bl.
25. The burning cross has become the Ku Klux Klan's signature act, a message that fu-
ture violent acts may be committed toward the victim. Matsuda, supra note 1, at 2365-66.
Surprisingly, the original Klan, formed to intimidate Southern blacks during the Reconstruc-
tion era, did not burn crosses. WYN C. CRAiG, THE FIERY CROSS 144-46 (1987). The tactic
originated with novelist Thomas Dixon, whose 1905 novel about the post-bellum South, The
Clansman: An Historic Romance of the Ku Klux Klan, includes descriptions of KKK mem-
bers burning crosses. Id. at 123, 146. Director D.W. Griffith depicted the cross burnings in
his popular film version of Dixon's novel, The Birth Of A Nation. Id. at 131. The film inspired
the creation of the so-called modern Klan, which burned a cross at its initial meeting at Stone
Mountain, Georgia in November, 1915. Id. at 146. Thereafter, cross burnings became a rou-
tine part of Klan activities. Id.
26. Brief for Respondent at 3, R.A. V (No. 90-7675).
27. Id..
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sided.28 Following a four-day investigation, police arrested seventeen-
year-old Robert A. Viktora and another young man.29 Authorities al-
leged that the two were the ring-leaders of a small band of "skinheads ' '30
who ignited the crosses to intimidate the Jones family. 31 Police charged
Viktora and the other young man with assault for causing fear of imme-
diate bodily harm or death32 and with violating St. Paul's hate-crimes
ordinance. The ordinance provided that
[w]hoever places on public or private property a symbol, object,
appellation, characterization or graffiti, including, but not lim-
ited to, a burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows or
has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm, or re-
sentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion, or
gender commits disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor.3
3
A juvenile court judge in a pre-trial ruling dismissed the hate-crimes
charge against Viktora, finding the St. Paul hate-crimes ordinance un-
constitutional. 34 The judge determined that the ordinance was over-
28. Id.
29. Id. at 4 ("Petitioner admitted-indeed in one instance, bragged about-his involve-
ment in the cross burning to two separate witnesses on the following day."). Because he was a
juvenile at the time of his arrest, the court cases did not refer to Viktora by name, but instead
used his initials. Newspaper reports, however, did reveal Viktora's name, in part because he
was no longer considered a juvenile legally when his case went to the Supreme Court. See, eg.,
Ruth Marcus, Supreme Court to Rule on 'Hate Crime' Laws; Teenager Challenges Charge in
Cross Burning, WASH. POST, June 11, 1991, at B4. Viktora's confederate was Arthur Miller,
III, then eighteen. Hamburger, supra note 24, at A8. At the time of the cross burning,
Viktora resided with Miller's family, who lived across the street from the Jones family.
R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2541.
30. The term "skinheads" refers to right-wing youth groups, who often have close-shaved
heads and believe in white supremacy.
31. Brief for Respondent at 4, R.A. V (No. 90-7675).
32. ST. PAUL, MINN. LEG. CODE § 292.01 (1990). The statute reads:
Whoever, intentionally or with reckless disregard of so doing, puts another in fear of
immediate bodily harm or death by placing on public or private property a symbol,
object, appellation, characterization or graffiti, including, but not limited to, a burn-
ing cross or Nazi swastika, which is reasonably understood as communicating threats
of harm, violence, contempt or hatred on the basis of race, color, creed, or religion,
or gender commits an assault and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
Id.
33. Id. § 292.02, quoted in R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at 2541. Viktora and Miller were the first
people ever to be charged with violating the St. Paul hate-crimes ordinance. Hamburger, supra
note 24, at A7.
34. In re Welfare of R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d 507, 508 (Minn. 1991). The juvenile court opin-
ion itself is unreported. While Viktora contested the charges, Miller pleaded guilty to both
counts and received a thirty-day jail sentence. Hamburger, supra note 24, at A8. Following
the Supreme Court's decision in R.A. V., Viktora continued to deny that he participated in the
cross burning outside the Jones' home. James Walsh, 100 Feet, 2 Worlds: Cross-Burning Sus-
pect and Victim Discuss Feelings Now, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., June 24, 1992, at Bl.
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broad35 and outlawed expressions protected by the First 36 and
Fourteenth Amendments.37 The city appealed the court's ruling to the
Minnesota Supreme Court, arguing that the hate-crimes ordinance could
be narrowly construed to reach only conduct that falls outside First
Amendment protection.38 The Minnesota Supreme Court agreed,39 con-
cluding that the ordinance could withstand a constitutional challenge if
construed to apply only to conduct unprotected by the First Amend-
ment: conduct constituting "fighting words"' or "incit[ement to] immi-
nent lawless action.""1 "So interpreted," the court noted, "the ordinance
is a narrowly tailored means toward accomplishing the compelling gov-
ernment interest in protecting the community against bias-motivated
threats to public safety and order and therefore is not prohibited by the
First Amendment."'42
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine the ordinance's
Viktora told the interviewer that he was a white separatist, but did not "believe burning crosses
on other people's lawns is right." Id at B2. He explained that he challenged the St. Paul hate-
crimes law because it was "a bad law." Id. Viktora, however, declined to discuss the case at
length because of fears that he might still be tried for the cross burning. Id. at B1.
35. In re R.A. V, 464 N.W.2d at 508. The overbreadth doctrine invalidates sweeping leg-
islation that outlaws constitutionally protected rights of free speech, press, or assembly along
with allowable proscriptions. See, e.g., Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 526-28 (1972) (hold-
ing that a breach of peace statute was overbroad because it outlawed protected expression as
well as fighting words). The overbreadth doctrine requires that legislation be invalidated if it is
fairly capable of being applied to punish people for constitutionally protected expression. Id.
at 520-22. Nevertheless, the Court has described the overbreadth doctrine as "strong
medicine" to be "employed by [courts] sparingly and only as a last resort." Broadrick v.
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973). The Court has allowed lower courts to construe statutes
narrowly to avoid striking down legislation as overbroad. Id.
36. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
37. The Supreme Court has determined that the protections of the First Amendment are
incorporated into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, thereby protecting
freedom of expression against infringement by the states. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652,
666 (1925).
38. In re R.A. V, 464 N.W.2d at 508.
39. Id. at 507. See Ernest A. Young, Note, Regulation of Racist Speech: In re Welfare of
R.A. V, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 903, 905-07 (1991), for a detailed analysis of the Minne-
sota Supreme Court's decision.
40. In re R.A. V., 464 N.W.2d at 510 (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,
572 (1942)). The Chaplinsky Court held that fighting words are not protected by the First
Amendment because such words are worthless speech. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572-73. It
defined fighting words as those words that enrage the average person to fight. Id.
41. In re P.A. V, 464 N.W.2d at 510 (citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969)).
The Brandenburg Court held that a state can regulate expression designed to incite riots and
other imminent lawless actions and the advocacy likely to produce such action. Brandenburg,
395 U.S. at 447. The Court in R.A. V did not consider whether the St. Paul hate-crimes
ordinance was constitutional under this standard. R.A. V, 112 S. Ct. at 2542.
42. In re R.A. V, 464 N.W.2d at 511 (citations omitted).
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validity under the First Amendment.43 The Court ultimately determined
that, even as narrowly construed by the Minnesota Supreme Court, the
ordinance still violated the First Amendment.' All nine members of the
Court agreed that the St. Paul ordinance was facially invalid,45 but four
members reached that conclusion for reasons different than the
majority.'
The majority accepted the Minnesota court's construction of the or-
dinance as pertaining only to fighting words.4 7 Nevertheless, the Court
determined that the language of the ordinance violated the First Amend-
ment because it did not meet the content-neutrality standard;4" the ordi-
43. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2542.
44. Id. at 2550.
45. Id
46. Id. Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas joined. Id. at 2541. Justice White filed an opinion
concurring in the judgment, in which Justices Blackmun and O'Connor joined and in which
Justice Stevens joined in part. Id at 2550 (White, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice
Blackmun filed a separate opinion concurring in the judgment. Id at 2560 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in the judgment). Justice Stevens also fied a separate opinion. Id. at 2561 (Ste-
vens, J., concurring in the judgment).
47. Id. at 2542; see also infra notes 114-80 (analyzing the fighting-words exception).
48. R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at 2547. The Court had never before applied the content-neutrality
rule to invalidate a regulation aimed at criminalizing a subset of fighting words or another
category of fully proscribable speech. See infra notes 181-93 and accompanying text. The
Court, however, has previously applied a content-neutral standard to invalidate statutes aimed
at regulating protected expression in a public forum. See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312,
319-22 (1988) (holding that a law may not prohibit only those picket signs outside a foreign
embassy that are critical of the foreign government); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267-77
(1981) (holding that a university with an open forum policy toward student groups may not
exclude a religious group without showing a compelling state interest); Metromedia, Inc. v.
City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 498-521 (1981) (holding that a city may not allow billboards
with noncommercial messages, while prohibiting billboards with commercial messages);
Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 208-17 (1975) (holding that a law may not
single out nudity in regulating films shown by drive-in theaters with screens visible from the
highway). Petitioner had argued only that the St. Paul ordinance should be rejected as facially
overbroad. Brief for Petitioner at 8-15, R.A. V (No. 90-7675). Nevertheless, the Court deter-
mined that petitioner's arguments implied that the ordinance should be deemed unconstitu-
tional for violating the content-neutral standard.
In his briefs in this Court, petitioner argued that a narrowing construction [by the
Minnesota Supreme Court] was ineffective because (1) its boundaries were vague and
because (2) denominating particular expression a "fighting word" because of the im-
pact of its ideological content upon the audience is inconsistent with the First
Amendment. At oral argument, counsel for Petitioner reiterated this second point:
"It is ... one of my positions, that in [punishing only some fighting words and not
others], even though it is a subcategory, technically, of unprotected conduct, [the
ordinance] still is picking out an opinion, a disfavored message, and making that
clear through the State." In resting our judgment upon this contention, we have not
departed from our criteria of what is "fairly included" within the petition.
R.A. V, 112 S. Ct. at 2542 n.3 (citations omitted).
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nance, instead of banning all fighting words,49 prohibited only a select
group of fighting words: insults aimed at race, color, creed, religion, or
gender.50 The Court had never before applied the content-neutrality rule
to invalidate a regulation aimed at criminalizing fully proscribable
speech. Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia noted that "[s]electivity of
this sort creates the possibility that the city is seeking to handicap the
expression of particular ideas."'" "The point of the First Amendment is
that majority preferences must be expressed in some fashion other than
silencing speech on the basis of its content."52 The Court pointed out
that the St. Paul ordinance permitted fighting words, as long as they did
not fall into one of the five prohibited categories.53 Thus, those wishing
to use fighting words in connection with ideas other than those expressly
precluded-such as "to express hostility.., on the basis of political affili-
ation, union membership, or homosexuality"-could do so freely because
such fighting words were not categories listed in the ordinance.54
The Court reasoned that the ordinance amounted to even more than
content discrimination-it extended to actual viewpoint discrimination. S
While insults against race, color, creed, religion, or gender were barred
by the St. Paul ordinance, statements in favor of race, color, creed, reli-
gion, or gender were not. 6 Thus, those arguing in favor of tolerance and
equality could use the most vicious fighting words imaginable to make
their case, as long as they did not stray outside the ordinance's guide-
lines." The Court noted that the First Amendment does not allow St.
Paul "to license one side of a debate to fight freestyle, while requiring the
other to follow Marquis of Queensbury rules." 8
The Court also determined that the St. Paul ordinance was uncon-
stitutional because it did not single out "an especially offensive mode of
expression," such as only those fighting words that communicate ideas in
49. See infra notes 114-80 and accompanying text.
50. R.A. V, 112 S. Ct. at 2547.
51. Id. at 2549.
52. Id. at 2548.
53. Id. at 2547-48. The hate-crimes ordinance outlawed expression and conduct aimed at
harassing a person because of her race, color, creed, religion, or gender. See supra notes 32-33
and accompanying text.
54. R.A.V, 112 S. Ct. at 2547.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 2548.
57. Id. See infra notes 114-80 and accompanying text for an analysis of the fighting-
words doctrine, which states that fighting words are not protected by the First Amendment.
58. R.A. V, 112 S. Ct. at 2548. The Marquis of Queensbury rules were a boxing code of
fair play developed in the 19th century by the eighth Marquis of Queensbury to govern boxing
matches. WEBSTER's THIRD NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LAN-
GUAGE UNABRIDGED 1384 (1976).
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an especially threatening manner 5 9 Instead, the ordinance prohibited all
fighting words that "communicate messages of racial, gender, or religious
intolerance."'
The Court also rejected the city's contention that the ordinance as
narrowly construed should be upheld because it served the compelling
state interest of protecting the "basic human rights of members of groups
that have been subjected historically to discrimination."61 The Court
agreed that there may be a compelling state interest in protecting such
groups, but it recognized that the goal could be achieved with a content-
neutral ordinance prohibiting all fighting words.62 Such an ordinance
would protect all citizens equally, not just select groups of citizens, from
being subjected to speech designed to provoke a fight. 61 "[T]he only in-
terest distinctively served by the content limitation [in the St. Paul ordi-
nance] is that of displaying the city council's special hostility toward the
particular biases thus singled out," the Court notedY4 "That is precisely
what the First Amendment forbids."
65
The Court, however, noted several exceptions to its holding barring
content discrimination. 6 The Court asserted that "[w]hen the basis for
the content discrimination consists entirely of the very reason the entire
class of speech is proscribable, no significant danger of idea or viewpoint
discrimination exists.' 67 If the reason for proscription is deemed neutral
enough to support exclusion of the entire class of expression from First
Amendment protection, the reason "is also neutral enough to form the
basis of distinction within the class."'6' To illustrate its point, the Court
noted that while a state can prohibit only obscenity that is the most pa-
tently offensive in its prurience, it may not prohibit only obscenity that
includes offensive political messages. 9 The Court also noted that the
federal government can criminalize threats of violence against the Presi-
dent, but may not criminalize only those threats against the President
59. R.A. V, 112 S. Ct. at 2549. The city argued that the ordinance was constitutional
because it had been narrowly construed by the Minnesota Supreme Court to outlaw only fight-
ing words and because the government has a compelling state interest in outlawing bias crimes.
Id.; see supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
60. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2549.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 2549-50.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 2550.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 2545-46.
67. Id. at 2545.
68. Id. at 2545-46.
69. Id. at 2546.
1261
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
which mention his policies on aid to the inner cities.70 The Court also
pointed out that the state may choose to regulate price advertising in one
industry, but not in another, because the risk of fraud is greater in the
former, but a state may not prohibit only advertising that depicts men in
a demeaning manner.7 1
The Court also asserted that its holding does not preclude regula-
tions of subclasses of proscribable speech when such regulations are
aimed at conduct. 72 In other words, "a particular content-based subcat-
egory of a proscribable class of speech can be swept up incidentally
within the reach of a statute aimed at conduct rather than speech." 73 To
illustrate its point, the Court noted that the federal government can ban
sexually derogatory fighting words under Title VII's general prohibition
against sexual discrimination in the workplace since Title VII is aimed at
conduct.
7 4
The Court determined that the St. Paul ordinance did not fall within
either of its stated exceptions to the content-neutrality rule because fight-
ing words are essentially a "non-speech" form of communication. 7
Fighting words, the Court asserted, are analogous to a "noisy sound
truck.176 Each is a "mode of speech" and can be used to convey an idea,
but neither falls within the scope of the First Amendment." Still, the
government cannot regulate either "based on hostility-or favoritism-
towards the underlying message expressed. '78
While striking down the St. Paul hate-crimes law, the Court as-
serted that it did not condone cross burning in anyone's front yard.79
The Court, however, noted that sufficient means were available to pre-
vent such behavior "without adding the First Amendment to the fire."8
70. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 871 (1988)); see also Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708
(1969) (upholding the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 871, but determining that the statute
could not be used to punish someone for making a crass joke about shooting the President).
71. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2546.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2 (1981 & Supp. 1992) & 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1991)).
75. Id. at 2545.
76. Id. (citing Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 282 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring)).
77. Id
78. Id.
79. Id. at 2550. The Court did not spell out the other remedies available. Id. Commenta-
tors in the popular press have suggested that criminal penalties such as trespassing, assault,
and communicating threats are preferable remedies since they do not criminalize viewpoints as
do hate-crimes laws. See, e.g., Breaking The Codes, supra note 14, at 8 (arguing that hate-
crimes laws are not necessary because most bias crimes can be punished by other remedies).
80. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2550.
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Justice White, joined by Justices Blackmun and O'Connor, and Jus-
tice Stevens in part, concurred in the judgment that the St. Paul ordi-
nance was invalid, but rejected the Court's argument that it is
unconstitutional to criminalize only a select type of fighting words."1 In-
stead, Justice White argued that the Minnesota court's narrowing of the
statute failed to cure the overbreadth problem,8 2 so that the ordinance
remained facially unconstitutional because it went beyond fighting words
to outlaw expression protected by the First Amendment that causes only
hurt feelings, offense, or resentment.8 3 Justice White faulted the Court
for not deciding the case on these grounds, since this was the argument
that petitioner had made before the Court. 4
Justice White criticized the Court for abandoning the categorical
approach, which he viewed as "a firmly entrenched part of our First
Amendment jurisprudence. '8 5 The categorical approach, as defined by
Justice White, provides that most speech is constitutionally protected,
but "expression falling within certain limited categories so lacks the val-
ues the First Amendment was designed to protect that the Constitution
affords no protection to that expression. 81 6 Expression deemed obscene,
libelous, commercial, or fighting words is subject to regulation under the
categorical approach.8 7 Justice White asserted that if the St. Paul ordi-
nance had been limited to fighting words it would have been a valid regu-
lation of unprotected speech under the categorical approach. 8
Justice White also criticized the Court for abandoning the over-
breadth test, "a fundamental tool of First Amendment analysis," which
rejects broad limits on expression in recognition that the First Amend-
ment protects most disturbing speech. 9 Justice White charged that the
81. Id. (White, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Stevens objected to Justice
White's support of the categorical test for First Amendment cases.
82. Id. at 2559 (White, J., concurring in the judgment); see supra notes 39-42.
83. R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at 2559 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
84. Id at 2551 (White, J., concurring in the judgment); see supra note 48. However, the
Libertarian Center for Individual Rights argued in its amicus brief for the petitioner that the
Court should find the St. Paul ordinance unconstitutional because it did not criminalize all
fighting words. Brief Amicus Curiae of the Center For Individual Rights in Support of Peti-
tioner at 12-15, R.A. V (No. 90-7675) ("In fact, the state's attempt to prohibit only a subcat-
egory of fighting words is strikingly underinclusive.") (citations omitted).
85. R.A. V, 112 S. Ct. at 2552 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
86. Id. at 2551 (White, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 2561 (Stevens, J., concur-
ring in the judgment).
87. Id. (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
88. Id. at 2558-60 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
89. Id at 2553 (White, J., concurring in the judgment). In challenging a law as over-
broad, a plaintiff is allowed to raise the rights of third parties not before the court, in effect
arguing that the law may have a chilling effect on the First Amendment rights of others be-
cause it is overbroad. See, eg., Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611-12 (1973) (stating
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Court's new content-neutral standard, which he labeled an "under-
breadth" test, can provide protection to expression that falls outside the
perimeters of the First Amendment.90 "[I]t permits, indeed invites, the
continuation of expressive conduct that in this case is evil and worthless
in First Amendment terms." 91
Justice White also asserted that the Court's stated exceptions to its
holding invalidate the content-neutrality rule. 2 He argued that the
Court's first exception, which allows subsets of proscribable speech to be
barred when there is little danger of infringement, is particularly prob-
lematic.9a To illustrate his point, Justice White contended that if the
federal law criminalizing threats against the President's life is not subject
to the rule because the President deserves special protection, then the St.
Paul ordinance also would appear to be permissible since it is designed to
protect groups that have been historically subjected to discrimination.94
Justice White asserted that the Court included its second exception,
which allows a subclass of proscribable expression to be regulated if it is
a secondary effect of conduct outlawed by a statute, in an attempt to
protect Title VII from being deemed unconstitutional under the content-
neutral rule.95
Justice Blackmun, in a separate opinion, reiterated Justice White's
criticism of the Court's abandonment of the overbreadth test in First
Amendment cases. 96 Justice Blackmun asserted that the abandonment
could lead to less "protection across the board" for speech, charging that
if the Court's decision means "all expressive activity must be accorded
the same protection, that protection will be scant."97 Justice Blackmun,
however, also noted that the Court's wide-sweeping opinion could prove
to be just an aberration: "a case where the Court manipulated doctrine
to strike down an ordinance whose premise it opposed."9
that overbroad regulations may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitution-
ally protected speech or expression).
90. R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at 2553 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
91. Id. (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
92. Id. at 2556-58 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
93. Id. at 2556 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
94. Id. (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
95. Id. at 2557 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
96. Id. at 2560 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Blackmun is a native
of St. Paul, which may explain in part why he filed a separate opinion, although agreeing fully
with Justice White's analysis. Paul Gustafson, Hate-Crime Ordinance Rejected; St. Paul Mea-
sure Limited Free Speech, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., June 23, 1992, at Al.
97. R.A. V, 112 S. Ct. at 2560 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
98. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Blackmun charged that the
Court may have tailored its opinion to attack the political correctness movement, noting that if
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Justice Stevens, in a separate opinion, also agreed with Justice White
that the St. Paul ordinance was overbroad, 99 but rejected the categorical
approach to First Amendment cases as too simplistic in its avoidance of
questions of context."° ° The categorical approach treats complex issues
as "all or nothing" questions and, thus, is unsound, according to Justice
Stevens' analysis.101 Justice Stevens also found the Court's content-neu-
tral approach problematic.10 2 He noted that despite its "simplistic ap-
peal," the Court's determination that distinctions on the basis of content
are invalid "lacks support in our First Amendment jurisprudence."' 10 3 In
Justice Stevens' view, prior First Amendment decisions by the Court ap-
plied a "more complex and subtle analysis," considering "the content
and context of the regulated speech, and the nature and scope of the
restriction on the speech."'" Had the St. Paul hate-crimes ordinance
not been overbroad, Justice Stevens contended that it could have been
upheld under this more complex test because it "regulates speech not on
the basis of its subject matter or the viewpoint expressed, but rather on
the basis of the harm that the speech causes."10 5
It is well accepted that the "bedrock principle underlying the First
Amendment... is that the Government may not prohibit the expression
of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disa-
greeable."1 6 This overriding principle notwithstanding, the Supreme
Court has long recognized several areas of expression that in appropriate
cases are not protected by the First Amendment's provision that
"Congress shall make no law .. abridging the freedom of speech, or
of the press."' 7 The areas falling outside the First Amendment are li-
bel, 108 obscenity, 109 commercial speech, 1  and fighting words.11  Of
this were the case, the Court's decision was "even more regrettable." Id. at 2561 (Blackmun,
J., concurring in the judgment).
99. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Stevens agreed with Justice
White that, despite the Minnesota court's narrowing, the ordinance remained facially over-
broad-going beyond proscribing fighting words to punish protected expression that causes
hurt feelings or resentment. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
100. Id. at 2566 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
101. Id. at 2567 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
102. Id. at 2566 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
103. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
104. Id. at 2567 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
105. Id. at 2570 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Stevens argued that
hate-crimes legislation is aimed at punishing conduct, not expression. Id. (Stevens, J., concur-
ring in the judgment).
106. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989).
107. U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
108. See, eg., Philadelphia Newspapers Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776 (1986) (holding
that plaintiffs suing newspapers for libel in matters of public concern must prove that the
published statements are false); see also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347-48
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these exceptions, the fighting words exception is perhaps the narrow-
est;' 12 the Court has applied it only once.
1 13
The Court recognized the fighting-words exception more than fifty
years ago in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire.1 4  Chaplinsky, a street
preacher, had been addressing passers-by in Rochester, New Hampshire,
when a disturbance occurred."' When a police officer started to take
Chaplinsky to the police station, they met the City Marshal. Chaplinsky
called the marshal a "God damned racketeer" 1 6 and a "damned Fas-
cist."' 1 7  The officer then charged Chaplinsky with violating a New
Hampshire ordinance that prohibited breaches of the peace by calling
another person an offensive name in a public place."1 The trial court
convicted Chaplinsky,119 and the state appellate courts upheld his con-
(1974) (holding that states may not enact strict liability laws for libel for private figures); New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964) (stating that a public figure must show
that the statements were published with actual malice in order to prove libel).
109. See, e.g., Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 506-07 (1985) (holding that
a state can enact regulations outlawing pornographic movie theaters as a moral nuisance since
obscenity is unprotected expression); see also Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 68-
69 (1973) (holding that it is within the state's interest to control obscenity in order to maintain
the quality of life and total community environment); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24
(1973) (holding that to be.deemed obscene, a work must depict sexual activity in a way that
violates community standards and lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value);
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484-85 (1957) (holding that obscenity is utterly without
redeeming social importance and thus is outside the protection of the First Amendment).
110. See, e.g., Board of Trustees of the State Univ. of New York v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 475-
81 (1989) (holding that the state can restrict commercial speech if the measures are narrowly
tailored to achieve the desired objective and do not regulate expression fully protected by the
First Amendment); see also Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1979) (stating that false,
misleading, and deceptive advertising is not protected under the First Amendment); Virginia
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770-73
(1976) (stating that commercial speech does not enjoy the same degree of protection as polit-
ical speech, the core First Amendment expression, because it is more easily verifiable).
111. See infra notes 114-80 and accompanying text; see also Stephen W. Gard, Fighting
Words as Free Speech, 58 WASH. U. L.Q. 531, 580-81 (1980) (analyzing the fighting-words
exception); Thomas F. Shea, Don't Bother to Smile When You Call Me That-Fighting Words
and the First Amendment, 63 Ky. L.J. 1, 21-22 (1974) (same). Shea concluded that the fight-
ing words exception is valid, but that the Supreme Court's decisions have made it impossible to
apply. Id. Gard argued that the fighting words exception is no longer valid in today's world
and should be expressly overruled by the Supreme Court. Gard, supra, at 580-81.
112. Gard, supra note 111, at 531.
113. Brief for Petitioner at 18-19, R.A. V (No. 90-7675); see also Strossen, supra note 1, at
510 (analyzing the Court's application of the fighting-words exception).
114. 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942).
115. Id. at 569.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
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viction, 120 despite Chaplinsky's contention that the law was invalid under
the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 2 ' The Supreme Court unani-
mously affirmed Chaplinksy's conviction. 22 The Court held that fight-
ing words, those offensive words "which by their very utterance inflict
injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace," are not consti-
tutionally protected.1 23 Writing for the Court, Justice Murphy reasoned
that fighting words do not deserve constitutional protection because they
are not an "essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such
slight social value.., that any benefit that may be derived from them is
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality." 24 The
Court, however, limited the ban on fighting words to immediate face-to-
face verbal encounters.1 25
The Court narrowed the fighting-words doctrine in Terminiello v.
Chicago,1 26 which also involved a breach of the peace statute. Termi-
niello, a suspended priest, denounced blacks and Jews 127 during a speech
in Chicago and referred to a violent mob outside as "slimy scum. '128
Police charged Terminiello with violating a city ordinance prohibiting
disorderly conduct. 29 The trial court instructed the jury that the ordi-
nance outlawed speech that "stirs the public to anger, invites dispute,
brings about a condition of unrest, or creates a disturbance." 130 The
Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding that the ordinance as
construed by the Illinois courts131 was unconstitutionally overbroad. 32
The Court rejected the principle that the First Amendment permits the
120. Id. The New Hampshire Supreme Court's decision is reported in State v. Chaplinsky,
91 N.H. 310, 18 A.2d 754 (1941).
121. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 569.
122. Id. at 574.
123. Id. at 572 (stating that the test for offensiveness "is not to be defined in terms of what
a particular addressee thinks," but rather what a person of common intelligence would under-
stand to be "words likely to cause an average addressee to fight").
124. I.
125. Id.
126. 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
127. IM. at 3.
128. Id. at 26 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
129. Id. at 3.
130. Id. Terminiello did not object to the judge's instructions to the jury. Ie
131. Id. at 5. The Illinois courts had construed the ordinance to allow conviction of Ter-
miniello "if his speech stirred people to anger, invited public dispute, or brought about a condi-
tion of unrest." Id. The Court noted that "[a] conviction resting on any of those grounds may
not stand." Id. The state court decision is reported in Terminiello v. Chicago, 400 Ill. 23, 79
N.E.2d 39 (1948).
132. Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 4-5. See supra note 35 for an explanation of the overbreadth
doctrine.
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silencing of a speaker who provokes a hostile reaction from a crowd.'
Instead, the Court determined that to be constitutionally unprotected
fighting words, the words must create in an intended recipient, not the
public in general, an immediate, uncontrolled, violent response.134 Writ-
ing for the Court, Justice Douglas noted that it was the purpose of the
First Amendment to invite dispute:
It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a
condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as
they are, or even stirs people to anger. Speech is often provoca-
tive and challenging. It may strike at prejudices and precon-
ceptions and have profound unsettling effects as it presses for
acceptance of an idea. That is why freedom of speech, though
not absolute, ... is nevertheless protected against censorship or
punishment, unless shown likely to produce a clear and present
danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above public
inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest. . . . There is no room
under our Constitution for a more restrictive view. For the al-
ternative would lead to standardization of ideas either by legis-
latures, courts, or dominant political or community groups. 135
Because the ordinance, as construed by the trial court, compelled a con-
viction for behavior that affected a response in the public in general, it
could not withstand constitutional scrutiny.1 36
In Cohen v. California,137 the Court reiterated the Terminiello hold-
ing that fighting words must be directed not toward the general public,
but toward a specific individual. Police arrested Cohen while in a Los
Angeles courthouse for wearing a jacket that bore on its back the anti-
Vietnam War message "Fuck the Draft."'' 38  The trial court convicted
133. Tenniniello, 337 U.S. at 4-5.
134. Id
135. Id.
136. Id. Chief Justice Vinson, Justice Frankfurter, and Justice Jackson filed separate dis-
senting opinions. Id. at 6 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting); id. at 8 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); id. at
13 (Jackson, J., dissenting). Justice Burton joined Justice Frankfurter in his dissent. Id. at 8
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Vinson asserted that the Court "revers[ed]. ..
because it discover[ed] in the record one sentence in the trial court's instructions which permit-
ted the jury to convict on an unconstitutional basis. The offending sentence had heretofore
gone completely undetected. It apparently was not even noticed, much less excepted to, by the
petitioner's counsel at the trial." Id. at 6-7 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting). Justice Jackson also
warned that the Court's decision meant that governments could do little to curb troublesome
subversives: "Terminiello's victory today certainly fulfills the most extravagant hopes of both
right and left totalitarian groups, who want nothing so much as to paralyze and discredit the
only democratic authority that can curb them in their battle for the streets." Id. at 25 (Jack-
son, J., dissenting).
137. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
138. Id. at 16.
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Cohen of violating an ordinance against breaches of the peace. 13 9 The
California Court of Appeals affirmed Cohen's conviction under the fight-
ing-words doctrine, holding that the offensive conduct required to consti-
tute fighting words included "behavior which has a tendency to provoke
others to acts of violence or to in turn disturb the peace."" The
Supreme Court reversed, determining that the fighting-words exception
did not apply.14" ' The Court, reaffirming Terminiello, noted that the
message on Cohen's jacket was not directed toward a specific person.142
Moreover, Cohen had not attempted to incite imminent violent action,
and no violent outburst had occurred in reaction to his jacket. 43
Justice Blackmun, in dissent, 1" contended that because the Califor-
nia law prohibited conduct, not speech, Cohen's conviction should be
upheld.145 Justice Blackmun also maintained that even if the California
law was directed at speech, it was constitutional under the Court's analy-
sis in Chaplinsky, because Cohen's "absurd and immature antic" could
prompt the average viewer into a fighting rage.146 The Court's decision
to reverse Cohen's conviction undermined the fighting-words exception,
Justice Blackmun argued.147
In its next fighting-words case, Gooding v. Wilson,' 48 the Court re-
lied on the overbreadth doctrine to strike down a Georgia statute.149
Wilson, during an anti-Vietnam War protest at a U.S. Army headquar-
139. Id.
140. Id. at 17 (quoting People v. Cohen, 1 Cal. App. 3d 94, 99, 81 Cal. Rptr. 503, 506
(1969), rev'd, 403 U.S. 15 (1971)).
141. Id. at 19-20.
142. Id.
143. Id. After deciding the message on Cohen's jacket did not constitute fighting words,
the Court then wrestled with a new issue: whether the message could be punished because it
was a vulgar expression thrust upon an unwilling audience. Id. at 25. The Court determined
that such punishment was unmerited. IM Writing for the majority, Justice Harlan noted that:
[W]hile the particular four-letter word being litigated here is perhaps more distaste-
ful than most others of its genre, it is nevertheless often true that one man's vulgarity
is another's lyric. Indeed, we think it is largely because governmental officials cannot
make principled distinctions in this area that the Constitution leaves matters of taste
and style so largely to the individual.
Id
144. Id. at 27 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
145. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The Court has determined that the First Amendment
does not protect pure conduct. See, ag., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)
(asserting that the government may regulate conduct if the governmental interest is unrelated
to freedom of expression).
146. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 27 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
147. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
148. 405 U.S. 518 (1972).
149. Id. at 519; see also supra note 35 (describing the use of the overbreadth doctrine to
invalidate state legislation).
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ters in Georgia, blocked an entrance so that arriving inductees could not
enter. 150 When two police officers attempted to remove him, Wilson told
one of them, "White son of a bitch, I'll kill you." ' He said to the other,
"You son of a bitch, if you ever put your hands on me again, I'll cut you
all to pieces." '52 The trial court subsequently convicted Wilson of violat-
ing the Georgia breach of peace statute,153 and the Georgia appellate
courts affirmed the conviction. The Supreme Court reversed, finding the
statute facially unconstitutional because the Georgia courts had not con-
strued it narrowly to apply only to fighting words.1 14 In its decision, the
Court did not answer the question whether the words uttered by Wilson
constituted fighting words."'5 Instead, the Court held that the First
Amendment requires that the governing statute be narrowly drawn so it
does not also encompass constitutionally protected speech.15 6 Under this
analysis, the Georgia statute was unconstitutionally overbroad because,
in addition to fighting words, it also prohibited expression that was
merely offensive, vulgar, or insulting to the person to whom it was di-
rected. 7 Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan noted that the stat-
ute as interpreted made it a "'breach of peace' merely to speak words
offensive to some who hear them, and so sweeps too broadly." '
Justice Blackmun, in his dissent, asserted that the Court's holding
effectively overruled Chaplinsky and made fighting words protected
speech under the First Amendment. 5 9 "For me, Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire was good law when it was decided and deserves to remain as
good law now," Justice Blackmun wrote, "But I feel that by decisions
such as this one.., the Court, despite its protestations to the contrary, is
merely paying lip service to Chaplinsky.:160
150. Gooding, 405 U.S. at 519-20 n.1.
151. Id
152. Id.
153. Id. at 518-19 (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 26-6303 (1972)). The decision of the Georgia
Supreme Court is reported as Wilson v. Georgia, 223 Ga. 531, 156 S.E.2d 446 (1967).
154. Gooding, 405 U.S. at 524-28. A court can construe a statute narrowly in order to
avoid striking it down as overbroad. See, eg., Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613-16
(1973) (asserting that the overbroad doctrine should be used only as a last resort); Dombrow-
ski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 490-91 (1965) (asserting that a court can narrow an overbroad
statute to cure the overbreadth problem).
155. Gooding, 405 U.S. at 519-20.
156. Id at 520.
157. Id at 525-27.
158. Id at 527.
159. Id. at 528 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
160. Id. at 536. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Some commentators have agreed with Justice
Blackmun that Gooding overruled Chaplinsky. See, e.g., Shea, supra note 111, at 14-15 ("In
arriving at these conclusions the majority adopted a definition of fighting words which, for all
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The Court in subsequent decisions relied on Gooding to invalidate
other state and local laws aimed at prohibiting offensive speech or fight-
ing words.161 In Lewis v. New Orleans,16 2 for example, the Court struck
down a New Orleans ordinance that criminalized "curs[ing] or revil[ing]
or... us[ing] obscene or opprobrious language toward or with reference"
to an on-duty police officer.1 63 A police officer stopped Lewis and her
husband while they followed another police patrol car in which their son
was being carried to a police stationhouse.1 4 Lewis, upset at being
stopped, allegedly called the officer "a god damn m.f. police."1 65 The
Louisiana Supreme Court, using the Gooding decision as a guideline, up-
held Lewis' conviction after construing the New Orleans ordinance nar-
rowly to pertain only to fighting words.1 66 Because the Louisiana court
had not actually narrowed or constrained the wording of the ordinance
in its decision, the Supreme Court rejected this construction. 167 Justice
Brennan, writing for the Court, noted that the statute remained facially
overbroad, 68 despite the Louisiana court's interpretation, because it
could be used to punish "speech, although vulgar or offensive, that is
protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments."' 169
More recently, in Houston v. Hill,170 the Court again used an over-
practical purposes, removed them from unprotected status and placed them under the guardi-
anship of the First Amendment.").
161. See, ag., Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 462 (1987); Lewis v. New Orleans, 415 U.S.
130, 131 (1974) [hereinafter Lewis I1]; Lewis v. New Orleans, 408 U.S. 913, 913 (1972) [herein-
after Lewis 1].
162. 415 U.S. 130 (1974).
163. Id. at 132.
164. Id. at 131 n.1.
165. Id. at 131.
166. Id. Lewis had been remanded to the Louisiana court by the Supreme Court following
Gooding. See Lewis 1, 408 U.S. 913 (1972), for the Court's original decision, and Lewis v. New
Orleans, 263 La. 809, 827, 269 So. 2d 450, 456 (1973), for the Louisiana court's decision
following remand.
167. Lewis II, 415 U.S. at 132.
168. Id. The Court found that the Louisiana court "did not refine or narrow" the ordi-
nance, but instead took the position that the ordinance as written "is narrowed to 'fighting
words' uttered to specific persons at a specific time." Id. (quoting Lewis v. New Orleans, 263
La. 809, 826, 269 So. 2d 450, 456 (1973)).
169. Id. at 134. Justice Blackmun, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist,
dissented from the Court's opinion on grounds that the Louisiana court's construction of the
statute cured any overbreadth problems. Id. at 136 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Powell
filed a concurring opinion, in which he argued that the fighting-words exception should not be
used for laws punishing citizens in confrontations with police. Id. at 134 (Powell, J., concur-
ring). In Justice Powell's view, police officers, because of their training, are less likely to re-
spond to fighting words than are average citizens. Id. (Powell, J., concurring).
170. 482 U.S. 451 (1987).
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breadth analysis to strike down a Houston, Texas ordinance. 17 1 The or-
dinance at issue prohibited the interruption of police officers during an
investigation, barring anyone from "willfully or intentionally interrupt-
ing a city policeman... by verbal challenge during an investigation."' 172
Hill, upon seeing a friend's car stopped by police officers, had shouted,
"Why don't you pick on someone your own size?" 173 One of the officers
then asked, "Are you interrupting me in my official capacity as a Hous-
ton police officer?" 174 Hill responded, "Yes, why don't you pick on
someone my size." 175 The trial court found Hill not guilty of violating
the ordinance, but he then ified suit in federal district court seeking a
declaratory judgment that the ordinance was unconstitutional. 176 The
district court upheld the ordinance, but an appeals court reversed. 177
The city appealed to the Supreme Court, which agreed that the ordi-
nance was unconstitutionally overbroad. The Court found the ordinance
was not limited to fighting words but prohibited expression that in any
manner interrupts an officer.178 "The Constitution does not allow such
speech to be made a crime," Justice Brennan wrote in the Court's opin-
ion. "The freedom of individuals verbally to oppose or challenge police
action without thereby risking arrest is one of the principal characteris-
tics by which we distinguish a free nation from a police state."1 79 Four
Justices dissented. 180
As the preceding discussion indicates, prior to its decision in R.A. V
v. City of St. Paul, the Court in various fighting-words cases had identi-
171. Id. at 472.
172. Id. at 454 (quoting HOUSTON, TEX., CODE § 34-11(a) (1984)).
173. Id. Hill, a well-known civil and gay rights activist in Houston, had been involved in
other disputes with the police. Id. at 453.
174. Id. at 454.
175. Id.
176. Id at 455.
177. Id. at 455-56. The court of appeals opinion is reported as Hill v. Houston, 789 F.2d
1103, 1110-11 (5th Cir. 1986).
178. Hill, 482 U.S. at 472.
179. Id. at 462-63.
180. Id. at 473 (Powell, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Justice Powell was
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Scalia. Id. (Powell, J., concur-
ring in part, dissenting in part). Justice Powell concurred in the Court's decision that the
Houston ordinance was unconstitutional. Id. (Powell, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part). He dissented, however, from the Court's determination that the ordinance was properly
before it for review. Id. at 473-75 (Powell, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Powell
asserted that the ordinance should be remanded to the Texas state courts for an interpretation,
noting that a state statute should not be interpreted by the Court without prior state adjudica-
tion. Id. at 475 (Powell, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Chief Justice Rehnquist
also wrote a separate dissent, asserting that the Court should uphold the ordinance as constitu-
tional because no authoritative construction had been provided by the state courts. Id. at 481-
82 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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fled five elements that must be present in order to sustain a conviction
under the fighting-words doctrine.18' One, the statute in question must
punish only those expressions that constitute extremely provocative in-
sults.182 Two, the expressions must have a direct tendency to cause an
immediate, violent response by the average recipient. 8 3 Three, the ex-
pressions must be made in a face-to-face encounter. 184 Four, the expres-
sions must be directed toward a specific individual, not a group.185 Five,
the law prohibiting the fighting words must not be broadly drawn to en-
compass constitutionally protected expression. 186
In R.A. V., the Court introduced a sixth required element: The stat-
ute must criminalize all fighting words, not merely a special subset se-
lected by the government. 87  According to the Court's analysis, this
ensures that when fighting words are expressed, no one side will have an
unfair advantage dictated by the state.' Laws prohibiting fighting
words, thus, must be content-neutral to withstand constitutional scru-
tiny.189 Singling out racist, sexist, or anti-religious expression for special
punishment as fighting words, as St. Paul did in its hate-crimes ordi-
nance, violates the Court's content-neutral standard for proscribable
speech because it does not punish all fighting words equally. 190 The
Court noted, as an example, that fighting words denouncing Catholics
could be punished under St. Paul's ordinance, but words denouncing
anti-Catholic bigots, however odious, could not.' 9 ' Thus, the Court de-
181. See supra notes 114-80. ,
182. See, ag., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971).
183. See, ag., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942).
184. Id.
185. See, ag., Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1949).
186. See, e.g., Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 520-21 (1972).
187. R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at 2550.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 2547-48.
191. Id. at 2548. Attorneys for the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) made a simi-
lar argument in their amicus brief in R.A. V., but reached a different conclusion. The ACLU
noted that any type of speech including derogatory remarks based on race, gender, or religion
would be illegal under the ordinance; thus, even the side holding up the sign denouncing anti-
Catholic bigots would be subject to punishment. Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Civil
Liberties Union, Minnesota Civil Liberties Union, and American Jewish Congress In Support
of Petitioner at 7-8, R.A. V (No. 90-7675). Unlike the R.A. V Court, the ACLU attorneys'
argument for striking down the ordinance was based on its overbreadth: that the ordinance
regulated a significant amount of protected speech, along with expression that may be regu-
lated legitimately under the fighting-words doctrine. Id. The ACLU contended that:
The reach of this prohibition is extraordinary.... For example, a resident of St. Paul
who erected a billboard on his own property expressing his own view that women
belonged at home rather than at work could easily be subject to prosecution under
the literal terms of this ordinance. Even more extraordinarily, the victims in this
1993] 1273
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
termined that the St. Paul ordinance, even as narrowly construed by the
lower court, must be rejected because it promotes viewpoint discrimina-
tion by prohibiting" 'fighting words' that insult, or provoke violence, 'on
a basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender.' "192 The First Amend-
ment, as the Court correctly noted, prohibits even the possibility of view-
point discrimination.' 93
On one level, the content-neutrality test articulated by the Court in
R.A. V seems clear and concise, and it underscores the importance of
First Amendment protections for disturbing speech.'94 Nonetheless, cer-
tain weaknesses exist in the Court's opinion, including problems with the
Court's overbreadth analysis, the uncertainty of the protections afforded
by the Court's content-neutrality approach, and the effect of the Court's
exceptions to its content-neutrality test on the viability of the test.
In its overbreadth discussion, the Court accepted the Minnesota
court's interpretation that the St. Paul ordinance "reaches only those ex-
pressions that constitute 'fighting words' within the meaning of Chaplin-
sky."19 It then devised its content-neutral test, failing to acknowledge
that it could always reject a fighting-words statute as facially overbroad if
the state court's construction failed to cure the overbreadth problem.
The Court's decision in Lewis v. New Orleans ' 96 is a prior example of
when it did this in a fighting-words case. As in Lewis, the Court could
have rejected the St. Paul ordinance as overbroad on the theory that the
ordinance criminalizes not only fighting words, but also speech that is
protected by the First Amendment. 97 The overbreadth doctrine is a fa-
miliar test, which prevents a chilling effect on expression protected by
the First Amendment.19 8 The doctrine protects those expressions that
fall short of being fighting words because they merely cause hurt feelings,
offense, or resentment. 99 Viktora's attorneys argued that the ordinance
should be rejected as facially overbroad. 2" The four Justices who con-
case would be facing prosecution if they responded to the cross burning by placing a
sign on his front lawn condemning white racism.
Id. at 8-9.
192. R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at 2547.
193. Id. at 2547-48.
194. Id. at 2547-50.
195. Id. at 2542.
196. 415 U.S. 130 (1974); see supra notes 162-69 and accompanying text.
197. R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at 2559 (White, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 2560 (Black-
mun, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 2561 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment); see
also supra notes 81-105 and accompanying text (discussing the three opinions).
198. See supra notes 148-80 and accompanying text.
199. See supra notes 148-80 and accompanying text.
200. See supra note 48.
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curred in the judgment favored invalidating the ordinance as overbroad
in part because the overbreadth doctrine has proven reliable.20 1
The Court did not demonstrate that its content-neutral doctrine,
which Justice White labeled the "underbreadth doctrine," is as beneficial
as the overbreadth doctrine. Indeed, the content-neutral doctrine pro-
vides protection to expression outside the scope of the First Amend-
ment;20 2 as demonstrated in R.A. V, this doctrine invalidates hate-crimes
laws even if they outlaw only specific unconstitutional fighting words.
As Justice Stevens pointed out, the Court's decision arguably gives fight-
ing words the same protection as political speech, the most protected
form of expression under the First Amendment, and more protection
than is authorized for commercial speech, a form of expression that the
Court has allowed to be regulated.20 3 It may be that the Court in R.A. V,
despite its assurances to the contrary, is paying only lip service to the
fighting-words doctrine. In other words, R.A. V may in effect prohibit
states from banning any fighting words. Alternatively, it may be that the
Court's content-neutral doctrine is a Trojan Horse of sorts. Justice
Blackmun asserted that R.A. V in time will serve to erode the protection
provided by the First Amendment. 2° In order to ban hate crimes, the
states will decide to enact wider bans that criminalize all fighting words.
Only time will tell whether the Court's content-neutral test will serve to
give less protection to all expressions or more protection to fighting
words.
Another problem with the majority's analysis is that the Court's test
is contrary to prior First Amendment cases, in which content analysis
played a major role. 0 5 Whether expression falls into the category of pro-
tected speech or unprotected speech is largely determined by content. As
Justice Stevens noted in R.A. V, content analysis has always played a
major role in determining "[w]hether a magazine is obscene, a gesture a
fighting word, or a photograph child pornography. ' ' 2 6 Although the
R.A. V Court contended that it was not abandoning this approach to
201. R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at 2550 (White, J., concurring in the judgment); see supra notes 81-
105 and accompanying text.
202. See R.A. V, 112 S. Ct. at 2553 (White, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 2563
(Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment); supra notes 81-105 and accompanying text.
203. R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at 2564-65 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
204. Id. at 2560 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment); see supra notes 96-98 and
accompanying text. Justice Blackmun implies that legislators may choose to criminalize a
wide variety of expression in order to circumvent the R.A. V decision and outlaw racist, sexist,
and anti-religious slurs. R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at 2560 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
205. See supra notes 114-86 and accompanying text.
206. R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at 2563 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
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First Amendment analysis, its opinion belies this contention.20 7 If the
test must be content-neutral, how can content be taken into account,
even in an attempt to determine whether an expression fits into one of the
categories recognized as being outside the First Amendment?
A final difficulty with the Court's opinion centers on the exceptions
it created to the content-neutral doctrine in an attempt to limit R.A. V to
only fighting words.20 8 The exceptions seem to invalidate the doctrine, as
Justice White adroitly pointed out.209 The Court's first exception, which
allows subsets of fully proscribable expression to be proscribed when
there is little danger of viewpoint discrimination,210 calls into question
the decision that the St. Paul hate-crimes ordinance is not permissible. If
all fighting words are outside the scope of the First Amendment, then a
statute criminalizing only those fighting words aimed at race, color,
creed, religion, or gender would appear permissible. 21I The Court's sec-
ond exception to its content-neutral rule, allowing a subset of proscrib-
able expression to be outlawed if swept up by regulations aimed at
criminalizing conduct, 212 also calls into question the determination that
the St. Paul hate-crimes ordinance is invalid under the content-neutral
rule. The St. Paul ordinance is aimed at outlawing offensive, hateful con-
duct; the proscribable expression is only becoming swept up in this
ban.2" 3 The Court, however, asserted that the St. Paul ordinance does
not fall within either exception because fighting words are simply a non-
speech mode of communication, rather than a content-based category,
and thus cannot be regulated by subsets.214 This misreads the Court's
previous interpretation of fighting words-as a fully proscribable form of
speech.215 It undercuts the Court's rationale for finding the St. Paul
hate-crimes ordinance unconstitutional under the content-neutral
standard.
While the Court's reasoning for its holding and its First Amend-
ment analysis are flawed, the Justices outside the majority do not provide
a satisfactory alternative. All four concurring Justices found the St. Paul
ordinance overbroad, but argued that hate-crimes laws, if they are nar-
207. See id. at 2545.
208. Id. at 2545-46; see supra notes 66-78 and accompanying text.
209. R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at 2556-58 (White, J., concurring in the judgment); see supra notes
92-95 and accompanying text.
210. R.A. V, 112 S. Ct. at 2545; see supra notes 66-71 and accompanying text.
211. R.A. V, 112 S. Ct. at 2556-58 (White, J., concurring in the judgment); see supra notes
92-95 and accompanying text.
212. R.A. V, 112 S. Ct. at 2546-47; see supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
213. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
214. R.A. V, 112 S. Ct. at 2545.
215. See supra notes 114-80 and accompanying text.
Vol. 711276
rowly gauged, do not violate the First Amendment, a conclusion less
appealing than the majority's. The First Amendment tests formulated by
Justice White and Justice Stevens are arguably even more problematic
than the Court's content-neutral test. Justice White's categorical test-
either an expression is protected by the First Amendment or it is not-is
clear-cut, but still troublesome because of its broadness. The test does
not allow for fine-line distinctions in determining whether an expression
is protected by the First Amendment because it ignores the aspect of
context, which has played an important role in prior First Amendment
decisions by the Court.216 Justice Stevens, who rejected Justice White's
test, correctly noted that to determine whether an expression is protected
by the First Amendment, it must be judged in the context of its setting,
use, and audience.21 '7 All three factors noted by Justice Stevens played a
major role in the Court's fighting-words cases prior to R.A. I;218 none of
these cases were decided on the pure categorical basis endorsed by Jus-
tice White. Because the overly simplistic categorical test ignores context,
it sweeps too broadly and could erode First Amendment protections if
used by courts.
Justice Stevens' test, however, is not much better. He suggested that
a court view the expression in light of its content, context, and the nature
and scope of the restriction.21 9 Such a test seems too vague; it could lead
to widely different results in different courts because it allows for subjec-
tive interpretation. Justice Stevens found that hate-crimes ordinances
would be deemed valid under his test, as long as these lavs are not over-
broad.220 Because Justice Stevens' test is not clearly and narrowly de-
fined, a court could use it to reach the same conclusion as the Court in
R.A. V: hate-crimes laws are invalid because they restrict only certain
viewpoints. A review of content and context, without more specific
216. R.A. V, 112 S. Ct. at 2566 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Stevens
rejected Justice White's categorical test because it did not consider the context in which an
expression is made. See supra notes 99-105 and accompanying text.
217. R.A. V, 112 S. Ct. at 2566 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). For fighting-
words cases in which context was a factor in the Court's decision, see supra notes 126-34 and
accompanying text (discussing Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949)) and notes 137-47
and accompanying text (discussing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971)). Justice Stevens,
however, did not rely on these cases to make his point. R.A. V, 112 S. Ct. at 2566 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in the judgment). Instead, he cited his concurring opinion in New York v. Ferber,
458 U.S. 747 (1982), in which he argued that the state can freely regulate most nonobscene
child pornography, but that such pornography may be protected by the First Amendment if it
is part of a serious work of art or part of legitimate sociological or scientific study. Id. at 778
(Stevens, J., concurring).
218. See supra notes 114-86 and accompanying text.
219. R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at 2567 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
220. Id. at 2569-71 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
19931 HA TE SPEECH 1277
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
guidelines, invites court manipulation to achieve a desired result, rather
than a fair decision.
Thus, despite its flaws, the Court's opinion in R.A. V remains the
most persuasive. The Court recognized that all hate-crimes laws conflict
with the First Amendment, while the concurring Justices did not. Still,
the Court would have provided more protection for offensive speech if it
had specifically provided that all fighting words are protected by the
First Amendment. As one commentator noted, the fighting-words ex-
ception "is, at best, a quaint remnant of a bygone morality."22' Today,
it is hard to argue realistically that any personally abusive expressions
made in a face-to-face encounter are enough to prompt the average per-
son into an uncontrollable fighting rage.222 Besides being an antiquated
doctrine, the fighting-words exception is problematic because it invites
misuse; it provides the state an opportunity to silence opinions that are
offensive to those in power.223 The Court in R.A. V made it more diffi-
cult, but not impossible, to use the fighting-words exception for these
means.
The Court noted in R.A. V that measures that do not jeopardize the
First Amendment exist to punish cross burning and other bias crimes,224
but it still did not address in a straightforward manner why hate-crimes
legislation is unnecessary. Advocates of such legislation have argued
that when it comes to racist speech, First Amendment values cannot be
considered in the abstract "by presupposing a world characterized by
equal opportunity and the absence of societally created and culturally
ingrained racism. '  In the real world of racial polarity, according to
these advocates, the content-neutral doctrine is immoral because it serves
only to keep racism alive.226 The free marketplace of ideas advanced by
the First Amendment can be realized only when minorities are en-
couraged to participate fully in that marketplace, these advocates con-
tend, and that participation can be achieved only by outlawing racist
speech.227 This view of the marketplace of ideas concept is misguided,
221. Gard, supra note ill, at 580.
222. Id.
223. Commentators also have argued that the fighting-words exception should be overruled
because it often has been used to create laws that restrict people from criticizing police officers.
See, eg., id. at 580. ("[I]t is almost uniformly invoked in a selective and discriminatory man-
ner by law enforcement officials to punish trivial violations of a constitutionally impermissible
interest in preventing criticism of official conduct.").
224. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
225. See Lawrence, supra note 1, at 437, 470-71.
226. Id. at 470-71.
227. Id. at 470-72. Lawrence argued that civil libertarians, by supporting free speech, have
helped make minorities second-class citizens. "[I] am troubled that we have not listened to the
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however. As first stated by Justice Holmes: "The ultimate good desired
is better reached by free trade in ideas ... the best test of truth is the
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the mar-
ket."' 22 8 A ban on racist, sexist, and other discriminatory speech not only
is contrary to Holmes' free marketplace of ideas, it also turns Ku Klux
Klansmen, skinheads, and other racists into First Amendment martyrs
in a society that greatly values free speech. Moreover, what guarantees
would there be that the state would not use its power also to curb objec-
tionable speech by minorities? The remedy for racist speech, as well as
all other forms of intolerant speech, is to answer it with better argu-
ments, not to suppress it with laws that will invoke sympathy for the
hate-mongers. As Justice Brandeis stated: "If there be time to expose
through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the
processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not en-
forced silence. Only an emergency can justify repression." 229
Without clear-cut maxims denouncing curbs on speech and without
expressly declaring fighting words to be protected speech, the full impli-
cations of the Court's decision in R.A. V are unclear. First, while the
Court clearly invalidated hate-crimes laws such as St. Paul's, it did not
necessarily strike down all hate-crimes legislation.230 An artfully worded
ordinance may pass the R.A. V test if it criminalizes all fighting words as
defined by Chaplinsky. The difficulty arises, however, if the Court's deci-
sion is read to require a court reviewing such a statute also to apply the
overbreadth test. If the answer is yes, as the Supreme Court implied in
R.A. V., then courts must use a possibly circular test of both content-
neutrality and overbreadth when reviewing hate-crimes laws. The diffi-
real victims, that we have shown so little empathy or understanding for their injury, and that
we have abandoned those individuals whose race, gender, or sexual orientation provokes
others to regard them as second class citizens." Id at 436. For a direct response to Law-
rence, see Strossen, supra note 1, at 559.
228. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Justice
Holmes' dissent has been called "the root of modem First Amendment protections" and as
such "has become as much a precedent as if it were a holding of the Court." SHELDON M.
NOVICK, HONORABLE JUSTICE: THE LIFE OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 473 n.87 (1989).
The free-marketplace concept is rooted in John Milton's 1644 anti-censorship tract Are-
opagiticia, in which Milton argued against English censorship laws since truth will win out in
any open encounter, and in John Stuart Mill's 1859 essay, On Liberty, which opined that the
public benefitted from freedom of expression because it encourages enlightenment. JOHN E.
NOWAK ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16.6 (3d ed. 1986).
229. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
230. Most commentators in the popular press, however, have read the decision this way.
See Hentoff, supra note 18, at A19. A few, however, have analyzed R... V. more carefully.
See, eg., Fighting Words, THE NATION, July 13, 1992, at 39 ("Justice Scalia's majority opin-
ion is nearly as poorly drafted as the St. Paul ordinance itself.").
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culties of devising and applying such a test may lead to conflicting results
in the lower courts.
Also unanswered by the R.A. V decision is whether campus speech
codes, which some universities have adopted to outlaw racist and sexist
expression, are unconstitutional. In some instances, the Court has given
freer rein to schools to circumvent the First Amendment.231 These deci-
sions have been in the context of secondary education, however. Thus, it
is unclear whether the Court's content-neutrality rule applies on the uni-
232versity campus.
A further area of uncertainty involves the decision's effect, if any, on
enhanced sentencing. R.A. V arguably does not invalidate enhanced sen-
tencing in crimes that are racially motivated. One state court, however,
already has read R.A. V as outlawing increased penalties for biased
233 thcrimes. Since the Court in R.A. V. distinguished between prohibiting
conduct merely because of its expressive content (as in the St. Paul hate-
crimes ordinance) and prohibiting conduct because of nonexpressive rea-
sons (as in Title VII's ban on sexual harassment in the workplace), it
231. See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988). The Court in
Kuhimeier held that the public school administration's censorship of the student newspaper
did not infringe upon the student newspaper editors' First Amendment rights. Id. at 266-67.
The Court determined that students' First Amendment rights are not automatically coexten-
sive with those of adults. Id. The Kuhlmeler Court also determined that the First Amend-
ment rights of students must be applied in fight of the special characteristics of the school
environment. Id The Court, however, left open the question whether its decision meant that
university and college students do not enjoy full First Amendment protection for on-campus
activities. Id at 273 n.7. ("We need not now decide whether the same degree of deference is
appropriate with respect to school-sponsored expressive activities at the college and university
level."). Because this remains an open question, it is unclear whether R.A. V. strikes down
campus speech codes, even if those codes violate R.A. V's content-neutrality requirement.
232. Nevertheless, at least one major university has read R.A. V as prohibiting speech
codes barring only racist and sexist speech. The University of Wisconsin repealed its speech
code because of the Court's decision in R.A. V Mary Jordan, College Repeals Speech Code as
National Backlash Grows, WASH. POST, Sept. 12, 1992, at Al.
233. The Wisconsin Supreme Court struck down its state's enhanced sentencing law, which
allowed for increased penalties for bias crimes, determining that the R.A. V Court's content-
neutral guidelines made such laws unconstitutional. State v. Mitchell, 169 Wis. 2d 153, 171-
72, 485 N.W.2d 807, 815 (1992). The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether
the Wisconsin court correctly interpreted R.A. V Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 810 (1992).
The Wisconsin court explained:
While the St. Paul ordinance invalidated in R.A. V is clearly distinguishable from the
hate crimes statute in that it regulates fighting words rather than merely the actor's
biased motive, the Court's analysis lends support to our conclusion that the Wiscon-
sin legislature cannot criminalize bigoted thought with which it disagrees.
Thus, the hate crimes statute is facially invalid because it directly punishes a
defendant's constitutionally protected thought.
Mitchell, 169 Wis. 2d at 171-72, 485 N.W.2d at 815.
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would appear that enhanced penalties for racially motivated crimes are
permissible. Such penalties do not punish expression, but acts of dis-
crimination.2 34 Although the state court appears to have misinterpreted
the R.A. V content-neutrality test, its decision is evidence of the confu-
sion arising from the R.A. V holding.
Because the Court did not provide clear-cut answers in R.A. V, it
may have to settle this debate in a later case. In addition, the question
whether campus speech codes are outlawed and whether all hate-crimes
laws are void still awaits final determination. Although R.A. V was the
first hate-crimes case decided by the Court, it promises not to be the last
since its ambiguity invites conflicting lower court decisions on statutes
outlawing bias-crimes, as well as uncertainty among legislators on how to
handle hate-crimes legislation.
THOMAS H. MOORE
234. The Florida Supreme Court read R.A. V this way, and affirmed its state's enhanced
sentencing law. Dobbins v. Florida, No. 91-1953, 1992 Fla. App. LEXIS 10062, at *3-4 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. Sept. 24, 1992). The court explained:
R.A. V dealt with an ordinance that expressly made criminal... the public expres-
sion of an intolerant opinion. We agree that the First Amendment prohibits intru-
sion into the rights of one to freely hold and express unpopular, even intolerant,
opinions.
But [Florida's enhanced sentencing law] does not punish intolerant opinions.
Nor does it punish the oral or written expression of those opinions. It is only when
one acts on such opinion to the injury of another that the statute permits
enhancement.
Id. at *4-5.
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